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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
R. W. FRANK AND COMPANY,
a Corporation, and UNITED
STATES FIDELITY &
GUARANTY CO., a Corporation,
Plailntiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and JIMMIE J.
ARKOUDAS,

Case No.

12624

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a claim for accident and injury benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

DISPOSITION IN THE.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission found that a compensable accident had occurred and awarded benefits to the
applicant. Thereafter the commission, with one commissioner dissenting, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Review.
This appeal followed.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the commission's order
vacated and set aside and to have the proceeding dismissed as to them.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed facts disclosed by the record on
appeal are as follows.
The applicant, 48 years old (R. 9) worked for R. W.
Frank and Company, hereinafter called Frank, for
approximately 20 years prior to his termination on
September 25, 1969 (R. 24). During at least the last
15-year period of his employment with Frank he had a
history of back trouble (R. 31), which was general
knowledge (R. 76) and which was known to Frank's
manager, R. W. Frank (R. 79, 80) and to the applicant's
supervisor, Arthur V. Mickelsen (R. 76). About 15
years before his termination the applicant filed a claim
with the Industrial Commission alleging back injuries,
but his claim was denied (R. 31, 32).
On January 17, 1968, unknown to his employer, the
applicant on his own initiative saw Dr. Robert E.
Morrow, an orthopedic specialist ( R. 15). In his office
record of that visit Dr. Morrow noted that
"[The claimant] has had intermittent back pain
for the past year, recurring about every month
or two. It grabs and catches him, and then will
gradually go away . . . He does only very little
lifting in his work . . . He has also experienced
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some dizziness, and for a month felt numbness
from the waist down." (Emphasis added.) (R.

15, 108-111.)

No mention was made to Dr. Morrow of any injury or
onset of pain or trouble within the previous week (R.
108), although the applicant later claimed to have
experienced a snap in his back two or three days before
his January 17, 1968 visit to Dr. Morrow (R. 27).
During the same visit Dr. Morrow noted atrophy of
1h inch in the calf of the left leg, which he felt was
"certainly indicative of a long-standing problem." He
also noted "definite degeneration and narrowing of the
L4-5 disc space" which is "ordinarily a chronic problem
He diagnosed a "degenerated cervical 'disc" and recommended bed rest (R. 108-1,11).
Within two or three days after his visit to Dr.
.Morrow the applicant advised his supervisor, Mr.
Mickelsen, of his visit to the doctor and that he had prescribed bed rest. He did not, however mention any
accident or onset of pain. The applicant testified at
the hearing in the Industrial Commission as follows:

"Q. And now specifically what did you tell
Mr. Mickelsen?
A. I told him that I saw the doctor, and that
I, he told me to stay home for five days,
flat on my back, don't even get up to go to the
bathroom.
Q. Well, what else did you tell him?
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A. That's all.

Q. So you didn't at that time tell him that you
hurt your back while lifting this paintt

A. In those words, no.
Q. Well, what did you tell him with respect to
that¥

A. Well, with respect to that, I - let's see.
Well, other than that what I - when I
told him what Dr. Morrow told me, I can't
remember of anything.
Q. In other words, you can't remember of
telling Mr. Mickelsen anything at that time
except you had been to the doctor and had been
told to lay off work for five days.

A. Uh huh. Yes.
Q. All right.
Now you then went back to work agam
after five days?
A. Yes. It was on a Wednesday I went to bed,
and I got up Sunday, and the following Monday
I went back to work.

Q. And did you talk with either Mr. Mickelsen
or Mr. Frank when you went back to work, that
you recall?
A. Well, I talked to Mr. Mickelsen.

Q. What was it you told him?
A. He asked me how I'm feeling, and I says,
'I'm pretty good,' I says, 'but I'm sore.'

Q. What else did you tell him?
A. That's all.
4
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Q. That's all.

A. That I remember."

(R. 34-35.)

The applicant returned to Dr. Morrow on February
7, 1968 at which time he was "markedly improved,"
with "only a little discomfort" (R. 111). He was advised
to take exercises and return for evaluation in six weeks
(R. 108). However, he did not return until October 8,
19G9, some 20 months later at which time he saw Dr.
:JJorrnw's partner, Dr. Robert H. Lamb (R. 111). On that
visit lie related a visit to Dr. Richard Morris three weeks
earlier for chest pain but he was advised by Dr. Morris
after examination and x-rays that the pain was coming
from his back (R. 111).
Dr. Lamb examined the applicant on October 8, 1969
and again on October 10, 1969. He noted a "marked
eollapse of L4-5 space" (R. 111). No mention was made
to Dr. Lamb at these visits or in connection with a
"lumbar disc fusion" operation on October 21, 1969 and
a cervical disc operation soon thereafter of any specific
injury or event which had triggered his complaints.
Further, there was no "actual herniation of the disk"
Lnt only "a long term problem of wearing out of a disc
rather than something which is the result of a specific
injury" (R. 109).
The applicant was examined November 4, 1969 by
Dr. \Vayne JU. Hebertson, a neurologist, at Dr. Lamb's
request. During that examination lw related that "he had
had low back pain for about 15 years following injury at

5

work. He reported back pain has been worse during the
past year and a half." No mention was made of any
specific recent event or injury as a cause of his discomfort (R. 16, 17, 112).
During the interval between January 14, 1968 and
his termination on September 25, 1969 the applicant
made no mention of his back problem to his employer,
other than that he had seen a doctor who prescribed bed
rest and his counsel stipulated at the hearing that no
accident was ever reported to either Mr. Mickelsen (R.
76) to l\ifr. Frank (R. 78), or to anyone else (R. 74).
·On March 4, 1969 he filed a claim, prepared in his
own handwriting, for sickness benefits under a group
policy carried by Frank with Aetna Life & Casualty
Company covering non-occupational health and accident
claims (R. 82). In this report he described his illness as
"back trouble" for which he was first treated January
26, 1968. In answer to the specific question "Is this claim
based on accident" he marked the "no" square and signed
the form (R. 82). The same form with the same answers
was completed, signed and submitted by the applicant on
April 22, 1968 (R. 83). Again on March 10, 1969 the same
form was submitted with the same answers except that
the date of first treatment was listed as December 16,
1968 (R. 84). Based upon these claim forms submitted
and· signed by the applicant he reeeived medical and
hospital benefits from Aetna totaling $3,442.74 (R.
88-90, 159).
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Soon after his operations the applicant contacted
U.S.F.&G. to claim workmen's compensation benefits,
which were declined following an investigation (R. 6).
This proceeding was initiated in the Industrial Commission upon receipt of the applicant's letter of January 12,
1970 (R. 7). The applicant in his application for hearing
received in the Industrial Commission on April 13, 1970
(R. 9) claimed that on approximately January 14, 1968
(which was a Sunday) he was "moving paint from basement, felt sharp pain in back, went numb."
In the hearing before Peter S. Marthakis, II,
Referee, on July 9, 1970 the claimant testifie'd that, except
for a 5-day period of rest following his visit to Dr.
Morrow on January 17, 1968 he continued at his regular
work for the Frank Company, including lifting as before
(R. 36). He also continued to bowl once a week in a
league during the 1968-1969 bowling season (R. 50-56).
At the hearing the appellant admitted in answer to
questioning by his own counsel that he knew any accident
should have been reported to his employer, but could
off er no reason for having failed to report in this
instance (R. 63). He was aware that other employees of
the Frank Company had reported accidents (R. 63). He
felt no worry about being fired or losing his job or
meeting any adverse reaction by reporting his supposed
accident, he just failed to do so (R. 64).
Also at the hearing the applicant admitted that he
knew the Aetna group policy covered only non-occupa7

tional siclmess and injuries (R. 43). In explaining why
he had filed false claims under that policy he testified as
follows:

"Q. Now, what did you have in mind when
you answered those questions, 'Is this claim based
on an accidentY' and you answered, 'No'Y
A. What I had in mind Y

Q. Yes.
A. I lmew the Industrial Commission wouldn't
do nothing about it, and I didn't have the money
to pay it out of my own pocket. So since we had
insurance, I put it down so the insurance company
would pay for it, since I was paying the premiums
every month.
That is the reason I put 'No' in that No. 8
question.
Q. In other words, you answered that in the
negative, you didn't actually mean 'no.'

A. That's right.
Q. Wasn't the fact that you put 'no' there due
to your lmowledge that you'd had this back
trouble over a period of years 1

A. No.

Q. Now, it is customary when you make insurance claims to not tell that truth 1
A. In certain cases, you have to.

Q. Why?
A. Well, when one company will not do anything about it, the other one that you pay
premiums for should do something about it.
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Q. Well, at that time, Mr. Arkoudas, in March
of 1968, you hadn't filed a claim, had you, with
the Industrial Commission 1
A. I knew it was no good in filing a claim with
the Industrial Commission.

Q. Why1
A. Because they wouldn't do anything before.

Q. Fifteen years ago 1
A. As I stated earlier in my statement." (R.
48-49).

* * *
"Q. (By Mr. Groth) Mr. Arkoudas, during the
years that you've worked at R. W. Frank Company other than this one, have you had any other
claim that you presented through the Industrial
Commission except the one that you did 15 years
ago1
A. In any other accident 1

Q. Injury, yes.
A. I can't remember, to tell you the truth.

Q. Now, your only explanation, then, putting
'no' there, when you didn't mean it, on those
squares, was that you didn't think the Industrial
Commission would pay your claim.
A. Right

Q. And that you knew you had paid premiums
on your group policy.
A. Yes.

Q. And therefore you thought you should be
reimbursed through that source.
A. Yes." (R. 49-50.)
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At the hearing the applicant also admitted having
discussed the case on or about November 5, 1969 with
Mr. Scott Olsen, an adjuster for U.S.F.&F (R. 57, 68).
In that conversation he told Mr. Olsen that he had had
a back injury about 15 years before which he reported to
the Industrial Commission (R. 59-60). He then testified:
"Question: All right. And then what?
Answer: Well, I just let it go, and let it go
year after year. It was aching. And about two
years ago my wife said, 'Let's go up and see Dr.
Lamb.'
Dr. Lamb was on vacation, so we saw Dr.
!f orrow. And he checked my back, and he said,
'It's real bad.' And he asked me where I was
working, and I told him. And he said, 'Let's see
what therapy does to it, and we '11 go from there.'
So we took some therapy, but it still ached on
me. I still worked on the job. And then all of
the sudden, about six months, I started getting
big sharp pains in my chest, and I didn't know
what the hell was the matter. And I thought maybe I was getting a heart attack. So I went up to
Dr. Morris, "" "" ""
He took cardiograms, and he took pictures of
my chest, my sides, everything. He came right
down to it, and said, 'All these chronic pains in
your chest are coming from your back.' " (R.
60-61.)
No mention whatever was made in this conversation of
any incident in January 1968 (R. 60).
10

Notwithstanding the foregoing status of the evidence the referee submitted the case to a medical panel
which was instructed to "assume that the facts surrounding the alleged accident are true" (R. 91). Following
receipt of the medical panel's report (R. 94-97) and a
hearing on objections to that report (R. 114-139) the
hearing examiner entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 149-151) in which he found
that the low back surgery as well as temporary total
disability and a 10% permanent partial disability were
the result of "the industrial accident of January 14, 1968"
(R. 150) and ordered the defendants to pay compensation
accordingly (R. 151).
Pursuant to a Motion to Review Order of Hearing
Examiner (R. 152-158) the matter was reviewed by the
commission and by a two-to-one vote the hearing
examiner was sustained (R. 166) over a strong dissent
by Commissioner Hadley (R. 167). This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY
SECTION 35-1-99, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953), WITH WHICH HE FAILED TO COMPLY.

Section 35-1-99, U.C.A. (1953), requires expJicitly
that notice of an accident must be given within one year.
"If no notice of the accident and injury is
given to the employer within one year from the
date of the accident, the right to compensation
shall be wholly barred."
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That section also provides that
"knowledge of such injury obtained from any
source on the part of such employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other
person in authority, or knowledge of any assertion
by the injured sufficient to afford an opportunity
to the employer to make an investigation into the
facts and to provide medical treatment shall be
equivalent to such notice ... "
A.s noted in the statement of the facts applicant and
his counsel concede that no notice of the alleged accident
was ever given to the employer or its agents (R. 74, 76,
78). It is claimed on his behalf, however, that because he
advised his supervisor "that the doctor had told him to
stay for five days, flat on his back" the Frank Company
"had sufficient knowledge to afford it an opportunity
to make an investigation into the facts" (R. 161) . That
such is not, and cannot be, the conclusion here is clear
from even a cursory review of the facts and the provisions of Section 35-1-99 cited above.
Where, as here, the applicant had a long history of
back trouble which was well known to his employer and
its management the mere mention of a visit to a doctor
and the fact that he prescribed rest cannot be construed
as the "notice of the accident and injury" which the
statute explicitly requires. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that his visit to Dr. Morrow or the prescribed
rest resulted from any specific episode or injury or that
it amounted to any more than a natural continuation of
his long-standing back problem.
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As is pointed out in the statement of the facts above,
the record shows not only that the alleged accident was
not reported to any agent of the employer, but that it
was not reported to any of the doctors to whom he went
for treatment. The record strongly indicates that he
himself felt that his pain was the result of his longstanding back trouble and not of a specific incident or
injury. Thus to say that his employer should have been
on notice of his accident and injury when he himself was
not enough aware to report it is nonsensical.
In the case of L & S Bearing Company v. Childers,
462 P.2d 532 (Okl.1969) the facts were strikingly similar
to those of the present case. There the applicant had
claimed that in April, 1968 she had "pulled her back, and
hurt her side and hip" while "unhanging some parts on
a machine." In that case her "hip and back started hurting some time before the date of the alleged accident" and
"two weeks before ... she told her supervisor that 'she
·wanted out of that department because the climbing hurt
her.' "
Also rn that case she claimed to have told a coemployee and her supervisor that her "hip and back
hurt" but she did not tell them of the alleged aooident or
why she hurt.
Within five days after the supposed incident she saw
a doctor who gave her sedatives and in June, 1968 she
underwent a fusion operation on her back. In May, 1968
she made a claim under the employer's group insurance
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which covered illness and disability "not arising out of
... employment," and in answer to a question whether
the "accident or sickness resulted from any employment"
she answered "no.'' Based upon this claim she was paid
benefits under the group policy.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed an award
of benefits made by the State Industrial Court upon the
ground of a failure to comply with the notice requirement
of the Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Act. The
court there stated:
"We have held in several cases that in the
prosecution of proceedings before the State
Industrial Court where the injured employee
relies upon actual notice to the employer as an
excuse for failure to give the 30-day written notice
required by 85 O.S. 1961, § 24, the evidence must
show the information imparted to the employer
to be sufficient to establish the occurence of an
accidental injury received in and arising out of
the employment (citing cases).
"Medical treatment by employer to employee
for treatment of disability believed by employer
in good faith to be due to sickness, or to a noncompensable injury, pursuant to claim filed by
employee under group insurance accident and
sickness benefits plan, reciting that the disability
was in no way related to the employment of the
employee was insufficient to constitute actual
notice by the employee to the employer of the
occurrence of an accidental injury within the
purview of the Oklahoma \Vorkmen's Compensation Act (citing cases).
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"There is no evidence in the record to sustain
claimant's contention that respondent had actual
knowledge of the alleged occurence of a compensable accident. The sole witness testifying on
this subject was the claimant herself. Her own
testimony refutes her contention. She testified
repeatedly that she did not tell respondent's
supervisor why her hip and back hurt, or how
she hi1irt herself. She did not tell her fellow
worker why she was hurt. She admits making
complaints of her back hurting about two weeks
before the date of the alleged accident.
"She adimts applying for and receiving
sickness benefits under the provisions of group
health policy, provided by respondent, covering
employees' sickness and accident disabilities, not
related to their employment. In her application
for these health benefits, she positively stated
that her disability was not related to her work.
Respondents logically concluded that no Workmen's Compensation claim was involved."
"The State Industrial Court's determination
that respondents 'had actual notice of said injury
and were not prejudiced by claimant's failure to
file the 30-day written notice, and therefore such
failure on the part of the claimant should be
excused' is not only unsupported by competent
evidence, but it is contrary to the positive evidence. The award is contrary to the rules of law
well established by this court in prior decisions.
It is therefore vacated."
In the present case it will be noted that, although
the question of notice was specifically raised as a defense
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by the defendants on the basis of the applicant's testimony (R. 80, 152, 154, 160-162), it was not even considered by the hearing examiner (R. 150-151) or by the
commission in its affirmance of the examiner (R. 166),
although the dissenting opinion concluded that notice
had not been given (R. 167).
In Sniith v. St.ate, 439 P.2d 242 (N.M. 1968), the
New Mexico court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the employer where it "did have knowledge that
the employee had developed a blister on her foot while
at work but did not know what caiised the blister or that
subsequent infection was connected with blister." (Emphasis added.) The court there held that such knowledge
did not constitute notice as required by the New Mexico
Act.
In 100 C.J.S. 337, workmen's compensation, Section
451 it is stated that
"Mere knowledge of the happening of an
accident, or that the employee was suffering from
an ailment, was hurt, became sick while at work,
or was tired out from work, is not ordinarily
enough [to constitute sufficient notice]."
In the present case it is clear that at most the
employer knew the applicant had been to see a doctor for
his back problem and the doctor had prescribed bed rest.
The evidence shows that neither the employer nor its
agents knew about any supposed accident or why the
applicant's back hurt, except for the long-standing back
16

problem. In short there is no competent, credible or substantial evidence, in fact no evidence at all, upon which
the examiner or the commission could find that the notice
requirement of the statute had been complied with.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY IN
THAT ITS AWARD IS UNSUPPORTED BY
ANY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND
DISREGARDS MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE.

The only evidence of any kind upon which the commission could have made an award was the self-serving,
totally unsupported and wholly discredited statement of
the applicant himself, belatedly made, that an accident
did in fact occur. That statement, which is contradicted
by the applicant's own representations and conduct over
a period of two years cannot, as a matter of law, support
the commission's award.
To begin with, although another employee was supposed to have been working with him at the time of the
alleged accident (R. 26) and although the applicant had
to lay down to stretch his back out right after something
is supposed to have given in his back, he made no claim
that the other employee was aware of the incident or
was advised of it by him. Nor was any report of the
supposed incident made to his supervisor or anyone else
even though, he knew that accidents and injuries should be
reported. Yet he made no attempt to explain away or
justify his unusual failure to let someone· know about it.
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More surprising and inconsistent still is his failure
to report any incident or accident to Dr. Morrow during
his visit within two or three days after the supposed
accident or during a subsequent visit about three weeks
later. Certainly, if such an incident or event had in fact
occurred he would have told his doctor, but he didn't.
Nor did he report any such incident to Dr. Lamb in Oct.
1969 or to Dr. Herbertson in November, 1969.
The applicant's return to work five days later and
his continued performance on the job just as before the
accident also are inconsistent with his claim, made for
the first time some two years later, that he had an accident on January 14, 1968. Similarly his continued
participation in his bowling league through the 1968-1969
bowling season indicates that no accident occurred.
Of particular significance in this sequence of inconsistent conduct and activity by the applicant is the claim
made under Aetna's group disability policy. He readily
admitted that he knew that policy covered only non-employment related activity. Yet he filed a claim in his own
handwriting and over his own signature and received
benefits of $3,442.74 on the representation that his
problem was not the result of an accident or his employment. This was done moreover without having made
any claim whatever to the Workmen's Compensation
benefits he had since claimed. His explanation of this
inconsistent conduct shows not only a marked disregard
for the truth but a callous indifference to the filing of
false insurance claims. Indeed his position, accepted by
18

the comm1ss10n, renders the proceeding before the
Industrial Commission a complete farce and a sham.
Having received the benefits of that policy, it is incredible that he should now be permitted by the commission
to take a concededly contradictory position in order to
receive larger benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Such a blatant disregard and contempt for the truth simply cannot be permitted to stand.
This is not a case of inadvertent or unknowing misrepresentation, but of purposeful and deliberate falsification for the admitted purpose of collecting benefits. Certainly the applicant's claim against Aetna is consistent
with his actions in failing to report any accident to his
employer or his doctors, whereas his claim in this
proceeding is not. It is also consistent with the findings
and diagnosis of Dr. Morrow and Dr. Lamb, whereas the
applicant's claim in this proceeding is not.
Even after his operations in October, 1969 he represented to the U.S.F. & G. representative that his
disability was the result of a long-standing problem and
no mention was made of any accident or incident on
January 14, 1968 or any other time (R. 60). Not until
the Application for Hearing filed April 13, 1970 is there
any indication from any source whatever that he claimed
an accident had occurred. And it will be noted that the
record of events between the date of the alleged accident
and the filing of his application in the Industrial
Commission is voluminous. It is also consistent except
for the applicant's own self-serving, belated and clearly
constradicted statement.
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On the basis of the record before the commission, its
award of benefits, unsupported by any substantial and
credible e,vidence and in disregard of material, substantial, competent and uncontradicted evidence to the
contrary, was arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, it would
be difficult to suppose a clearer example of the arbitrary
disregard of uncontradicted facts than the present case.
An affirmance of the award would render meaningless
the proceedings of the Industrial Commission and permit
a recovery of benefits by any applicant who would be
willing to fabricate a supposed accident, notwithstanding
an abundance of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Rendered meaningless would be the usual rules regarding burden of proof and evidence in such proceedings.
No Utah cases have dealt with the precise question
presented here. The Supreme Court of Illinois however
ruled on an almost identical fact situation in United
States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ill.2d 407,
134 N.E. 2d 307 (1956) and Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 6 Ill.2d 439', 128 N.E. 2d 919
(1955). In both of those cases as here the employee (1)
made a belated claim unsupported by other witnesse.s
that he had had an accident; ( 2) failed to report the supposed accident to his employer or its agents; (3) filed a
claim for benefits under a non-occupational group policy
and received benefits and ( 4) represented to the group
insurer that the disability did not result from an accident.
In the United States Steel case as here there was also a
long-standing history of back trouble and a failure by
the applicant to mention any incident or accident to his
doctor. In each of those cases an award of compensation
benefits was reversed and set aside.
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CONCLUSION
Applicant's claim to compensation benefits is barred
by his failure to comply with the one-year notice
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. His
claim that the employer had actual notice of the supposed
"accident and injury" is nowhere supported in the record
and cannot justify his unexplained and unreasonable
failure to report.
The commission's award of benefits is unsupported
by any competent, substantial evidence in view of the
applicant's own representations and action for a period
of some two years that his disability was not related to
an accident. His application for and receipt of benefits
under the Aetna group policy was based upon his representation that no accident was involved and this position
is consistent with his representations to Dr. Morrow, Dr.
Lamb, Dr. Hebertson and Mr. Olsen. The award of
compensation benefits permits the applicant to have his
cake and eat it too. It makes a mockery and a farce of
the entire proceeding and runs in the face of established
rules of evidence and burden of proof.
In making its award the commission acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. The award should be vacated and set
aside and this proceeding should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

Earl J. Groth
Attorney for Plaintiffs
501 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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